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Recent Decisions

CIVIL RIGHTS-AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990-PROHIBITION
OF PUBLIC ENrrY DISCRIMINATION AGAINST QUALIFIED INDIVIDUAL WITH A
TO INMATES IN STATE PRISONS-The United
States Supreme Court held that Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, which prohibits a public entity from
discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability on
account of that individual's disability, applies to inmates in state
prisons.
DISABLITY-APPLICATION

Pa. Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (1998).
In May 1994, Ronald R. Yeskey ("Yeskey") was sentenced to the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections for a maximum period of
three years.' The sentencing court recommended that Yeskey be
admitted to the state's motivational boot camp, where he would be
eligible for release in six months.2 Despite this recommendation,
Yeskey was refused admission to the program because of a medical
3
history of hypertension.
Yeskey subsequently brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the
Department of Corrections and several department officials
("Department"). 4 Yeskey alleged that his exclusion from the camp
1. Pa- Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1954 (1998). Yeskey was
sentenced to serve 18 to 36 months in a Pennsylvania correctional facility. Id.
2. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954. Yeskey would have been released on parole in six months
upon successful completion of the camp pursuant to the Motivational Boot Camp Act, 61 PA.
CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1121 et seq. (West Supp. 1997). Id.
3. Id. Hypertension is defined as a "systematic condition that is either symptomless or
is accompanied by nervousness, dizziness, or headache." WEBSTER'S NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1113 (3d ed. 1986).
4. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for
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violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA). 5 Holding that
the ADA was inapplicable to state prison inmates, the district court
dismissed Yeskey's complaint. 6 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 7 The Third Circuit held
that the ADA was applicable to state prison programs and that
state prisoners are entitled to protection under the ADA. 8 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Third Circuit's
decision.9
On appeal, the Court addressed the issue of whether the ADAs
prohibition of a public entity's discrimination against a qualified
individual with a disability applies to state prison inmates. 10 Relying
on a canon of statutory construction set forth in Gregory v.
Ashcroft, the Department argued that inmates of state prisons are
not covered by the ADA." The Department also contended that the
language of the statute was ambigiuous with regard to the
12
application of the ADA to both state prisons and state prisoners.
Finally, the Department argued that the ADA does not cover state
prison inmates because the statute does not specifically provide for
13
such application.
The Court addressed the Department's first contention by
examining the canon of statutory construction set forth in
Gregory.14 The Court noted that Gregory relied on the rule that the
the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 1952.
5. Id. at 1954. Title IH of the ADA prohibits a "public entity" from discriminating against
a "qualified individual with a disability" on account of that disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et
seq. (1994).
6. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954. The District Court dismissed the claim pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Id.
7. Id.
8. Yeskey v. Pa Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168 (3d. Cir. 1997).
9. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954.
10. Id.
11. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (holding
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994), does not
cover state judges)).
12. Id. at 1955. The Department argued that the phrase "benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity," as used in the statute, is ambiguous because such
benefits are not provided to prisoners as those terms are ordinarily understood. Id. The
Department also argued that the term "qualified individual with a disability," as used in the
statute, creates an ambiguity with the application of the statute to state prisoners. Id.
13. Id. The Department contended that the ADA does not cover state prison inmates
because the statute's statement of findings and purpose fails to mention either prisons or
prisoners. Id.
14. Id. at 1954. In Gregory, the Supreme Court held that state judges were not covered
by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Id. (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 452).
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Court will interpret a statute to preserve the states' sovereign
powers unless there is a clear expression of intent to change the
constitutional balance between the federal government and the
states. 15 Recognizing that a state has a strong interest in utilizing
control over the operations of state prisons, 16 the Court assumed
that such an exercise, like the establishment of the qualifications of
state judges, was subject to the "plain statement" rule of Gregory.7
However, the Court distinguished the non-application of Age
Discrimination in Employment Act to state judges from the
8
situation at bar.'
To distinguish Gregory, the Court assumed that the plain
statement rule governed the issue under consideration. 9 Moreover,
the Court held that the requirement of the rule was fulfilled
because the language of the ADA includes coverage of state prisons
and prisoners. 20 The language of the statute in Gregory afforded an
exception that meant that appointed state judges were not within
the coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.2' The
Court noted that the Yeskey situation was unlike that in Gregory.22
The language of the ADA clearly covers state prisoners because a
state prison is a "public entity," as defined by the statute2
15. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954. The Court stated that absent an "unmistakably clear"
expression of Congressional intent to "alter the usual constitutional balance between the
States and the Federal Government," the Court will construe a statute to preserve substantial
sovereign powers of the States, rather than to destroy them. Id. (quoting Gregory, 501 U.S. at
460-61).
16. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954. The Court noted that "it is difficult to imagine an activity
in which a State has a stronger interest." Id. (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491
(1973)).
17. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954. The Court reasoned that traditional and essential state
functions, such as establishing the qualifications of state government officials or even
exercising control over the management of state prisons, are subject to the plain statement
rule of Gregory. Id.
18. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1994)).
19. Id. The Court made this assumption without deciding specifically that the rule does
govern application of the statute to the administration of state prisons. Id.
20. Id. The Court found that the requirement of the rule was amply met because the
language of the ADA "unmistakably" included such coverage. Id.
21. Id. Although that statute "plainly covered state employees, it contained an
exception for 'appointee[s] on the policymaking level.' Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 467 (1991)).
22. Id. Here, the ADA's coverage of state prisons was free from doubt because the
statute plainly afforded coverage to state institutions without any exception. Id.
23. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. At 1954. Titie 1I of the ADA states: "[siubject to the provisions of
this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C §
12132 (1994). Public entity includes "any department, agency, special purpose district, or
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The Court then considered the Department's contention that the
language of the statute, specifically the phrase "benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity," is ambiguous
because state prisoners are not afforded the "benefits" of
"programs, services, or activities" as those terms are ordinarily
understood. 24 Noting that modem prison inmates are afforded and
benefitted by numerous "services, programs, or activities," the
Court rejected the Department's contention. 25 Moreover, the Court
noted that the Motivational Boot Camp Act 26 alluded to the camp
as a "program."27 As a result, the Court concluded that the language
of the ADA did not provide a basis for exempting state prisons
28
from the class of covered public entities.
Examining the definition of the term "qualified individual with a
disability" as set forth in the statute, the Court also rejected the
Department's argument that ambiguity existed as to whether the
term applied to state prisoners. 29 The Court noted that the words
"eligibility" and "participation," as used in the statutory definition of
the term "qualified individual with a disability," did not connote
voluntariness, as the Department argued.30 Furthermore, even if the
words did connote voluntariness, the Court opined that it would be
incorrect to hold that all prison "services, programs, or activities"
are not within the coverage afforded by the ADA because not all
other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B)
(1994).
24. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1955 (citing 42 U.S.C § 12132 (1994)).
25. Id. The Court noted that "prisons provide inmates with many recreational
'activities,' medical 'services,' and educational and vocational 'programs' " that benefit
prisoners. Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 580 (1984) (reference to "contact
visitation program"); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 552 (1984) (discussion of "rehabilitative
programs and services"); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 246 (1983) (reference to
"appropriate correctional programs for all offenders")).
26. 61 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §' 1121-1129 (West Supp. 1998).
27. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1955 (citing 61 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1123 (West Supp. 1998)).
28. Id.
29. Id. The statute defines the term "qualified individual with a disability" to include
any disabled individual "who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, the removal or architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the
receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity."
42 U.S.C § 12132(2) (1994).
30. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1955. Using the example of a drug addict convicted of
possession who was required to participate in a drug treatment program for which only
addicts were eligible, the Court stated that "[wihile 'eligible' individuals 'participate'
voluntarily in many programs, services, and activities, there are others for which they are
eligible in which 'participation' is mandatory." Id.
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such services are mandatory.31 Moreover, the Court noted that the
Motivational Boot Camp Act itself provided that participation in the
32
program was voluntary.
Responding to the Department's final argument, the Court stated
that the fact that a statute, such as the ADA, could be applied in
situations not expressly envisioned by Congress was an example of
the statute's "breadth" rather than ambiguityY In concluding that
the text of the statute was unambiguous, the Court also rejected
the Department's request to follow the doctrine of constitutional
doubt and prohibit coverage of the ADA to state prison inmates. 34
The Court noted that the doctrine, as well as the invocation of the
statute's title, becomes a part of statutory interpretation only where
the statute affords multiple constructions.3 5 Therefore, the Court
held that the ADA affords coverage to state prison inmates and
36
affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Before the passage of the ADA, individuals with disabilities
lacked comprehensive protection against discrimination.3 7 For
example, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibited discrimination
on the basis of disability only by public programs and agencies that
receive federal funding. 8 In addition, other federal statutes failed to
establish a general prohibition of discrimination against disabled
31. Id. For example, a prison law library was a service afforded to prisoners. Id.
32. Id. The Motivational Boot Camp Act provides that "an eligible inmate may make an
application to the motivational boot camp selection committee for permission to participate
in the motivational boot camp program." 61 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1126(a) (West.Supp. 1998).
33. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1956. The Department argued that the ADA's statement of
findings and purpose at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 failed to mention both prisons and prisoners and
that such failure proved that Congress did not anticipate application to state prison inmates.
Id. at 1955. The Court responded that such an assertion was questionable, but even assuming
such to be correct, it was irrelevant in a situation of unambiguous statutory text. Id. at 1956.
34. Id. The doctrine of constitutional doubt requires that the Court interpret statutes
with the goal of avoiding "grave and doubtful constitutional questions." Id. (citing United
States ex ret. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
35. Id. The doctrine of constitutional doubt "enters in only where 'a statute is
susceptible of two constructions." Id. (quoting United States ex ret. Attorney General v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)). Furthermore, "[t]he title of a statute ...
cannot limit the plain meaning of the text ... [it is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on
some ambiguous word or phrase." Id. (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)).
36. Id.
37. H.R REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 330.
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-794 (1994). Section 504 of the Act states in part, "[n]o otherwise
qualified individual with a disability in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. ."
29
U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
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persons. 39 Responding to the inadequate protection provided by
these existing statutes, Congress expanded coverage by enacting
40
the ADA.
The main purpose of the ADA was to "provide a clear and
comprehensive
national mandate
for the elimination
of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 41 As a result,
the ADA extended protection to individuals with disabilities by
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability by state and
local governments, 42 public and private employers," private
businesses that provide goods and services to the public," and
transportation systems. 4 Specifically, Title II of the ADA prohibited
a "public entity" from discriminating against a "qualified individual
with a disability."46 Because the language of Title II afforded
disabled individuals access to programs and services provided by
39. Statutes prohibiting discrimination against people with disabilities include the Fair
Housing Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1988) (prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of disability in the sale or rental of housing), the Architectural Barriers Act, 42 U.S.C. §
4151-4157 (1994) (requiring that buildings receiving federal financial assistance provide
access to those buildings), and Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §
1400-1491 (1994) (mandating that services related to special education be designed to satisfy
the needs related to disabled children).
40. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 47-48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.AN. 303, 330.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). (1994). Other purposes include providing "clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities," 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2), ensuring that the "Federal Government plays a central
role in enforcing the standards established... on behalf of individuals with disabilities," 42
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3), and invoking the "sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §
12101(b)(4).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12111.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
.45. 42 U.S.C. § 12161.
46. 42 U.S.C § 12131. Title II states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall,
by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by
anysuch entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A "public entity" is defined broadly to include "any State
or local government"and "any department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or States or local government.' 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). Under Title II,
a "qualified individual" is an "individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or
transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The ADA defines a "disability" to
include "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment." 42 .U.S.C. § 12102(2).
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state and local governments, 47 prisoners who sought relief under
the ADA have typically brought suit under Title II.4
The issue of whether Title II of the ADA covered inmates in state
prisons was first presented on a motion for summary judgment in
Outlaw v. City of Dothan, Alabama.4 9 Examining the language of
Title II, the district court concluded that the city of Dothan was a
"public entity" and that all of the city jail's facilities constituted a
"service, program or activity" of the public entity, as defined by
Title I. 5 The court held that the ADA required the City to make its
with disabilities. 51
jail's facilities accessible to prisoners
Subsequently, other district courts allowed state prison inmates to
52
seek relief under Title II of the ADA.
In 1995 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
refused to extend relief under the ADA to an inmate who was
denied accommodations while incarcerated in a state prison.6 The
Torcasio C6urt identified the management of state prisons as a
core state function that was subject to the plain statement rule set
forth in Gregory.5 Examining the language of Title II of the ADA,
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
48. See, e.g., Amos v. Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services,
126 F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S.Ct. 2339 (1998) (thirteen disabled
inmates sought relief under Title II against prison officials for violation ADA). However, suits
concerning prison employment have been brought under Title I. See, e.g., White v. Colorado,
82 F3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996) (dismissing injured prisoner's claim that Title I afforded
relief for violation of ADA).
49. No. CV-92-A-1219-S, 1993 WL 735802 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 1993). While serving a
twelve day sentence in the Dothan Municipal Jail, Outlaw requested the use of a plastic chair
when showering because he must remove his artificial leg in order to shower. Id. at *2. The
jail refused his request, and Outlaw filed suit alleging that the City of Dothan had violated
his rights under Title 1I of the ADA. Id.
50. Outlaw, 1993 WL 735802, at *4.
51. Id. The Court noted that whether the City did refuse to grant such accomodation
was a material issue of fact. Id.
52. Noland v. Wheatley, 835 FSupp 476,483 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (motion to dismiss
semi-quadriplegic inmate's claim for denial of access to sufficient care in violation of the
ADA denied); Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F.Supp 1019, 1044 (S.D.N.Y 1995) (prison's refusal to
grant reasonable accommodations to hearing-impaired inmates constituted a violation of the
ADA); Rewolinski v. Morgan, 896 F.Supp. 879, 881 (E.D.Wis. 1995) (a deaf inmate's allegations
that he was being discriminated against and denied access to prison services and programs
because of his disability in violation of the ADA were held not frivolous); Dean v. Knowles,
912 F.Supp. 519, 521 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (a material issue of fact existed as to whether HIV
positive inmate suffered discrimination on account of his disability in violation of the ADA).
53. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995). An obese inmate brought action
against prison officials of the Virginia Department of Corrections for failure to modify his
cell, bathroom facilities, and recreational areas to accommodate his obese condition. Id. at
1342.
54. Torcasio, 57 F3d at 1344-1346. The plain statement rule is a canon of statutory
construction providing that a court shall interpret a statute to preserve the sovereign powers
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the court declined to adopt the inmate's assertion that the "broad,
non-specific language" of Title II clearly established that the ADA
covers state prisons.5 5 Noting that the terms "eligible" and
"participate," as used in the statutory definition of a "qualified.
individual with a disability," connote voluntariness on the part of
such an individual, the court reasoned that state prison inmates
were not capable of fulfilling the essential eligibility requirements
of the statute.5 Therefore, the Court concluded that the ADA
neither covered state prisons nor extended protection to state
57
prisoners.
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, other circuit courts
subsequently held the ADA applicable to inmates in state prisons.8
The Seventh Circuit extended the statute's coverage to state
prisoners by refusing to create an exception to the application of
of the states unless there exists an "unmistakably clear" expression of intent to "alter the
usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government." Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991).
55. Torcasio, 57 F3d at 1346. "Congress must speak unequivocally before we will
conclude that it has clearly subjected state prisons to its enactments." Id.
56. Id. at 1347. The terms "eligible" and "participate" "do not bring to mind prisoners
who are being held against their will." Id.
57. Id. The Court reached this conclusion on the basis that it was not clearly
established that the ADA applied to state prisons. Id. at 1346, 1352. Relying on Torcasio and
adopting the Court's reasoning, two district courts and one circuit court subsequently held
the ADA inapplicable in the state prison context. Staples v. Va Dep't of Corrections, 904
F.Supp. 487, 490 (E.D.Va 1995) (granting summary judgment against a paraplegic' inmate
alleging violation of rights under ADA); Pierce-v. King, 918 ESupp. 932, 938 (E.D.N.C. 1996)
(granting summary judgment against state inmates who were displeased with their prison
work assignments), affd, 131 F3d 136 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded,-S.Ct. -, No.
97-8592, 1998 WL 174842 (Oct. 05, 1998); White v. Colorado, 82 F3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that state prisons do not engage in the programs or activities governed by the
ADA). See also, Gorman v. Batch, 925 FSupp. 653, 655-56 (W.D.Mo. 1996) (holding that a
wheelchair-bound arrestee who was injured when being transported in police, van that was
not equipped with wheelchair restraints was not a "qualified individual" under the ADA)
appeal dismissed, 123 F.3d 1126 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part, rev'd in part, 152 F3d 907
(8th Cir. 1998).
58. Bullock v. Gomez, 929 ESupp. 1299, 1303 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (denying motion for
summary judgment against HIV-positive inmate); Niece v. Fitzner, 941 F.Supp. 1497, 1505
(E.D. Mich. 1996) (denying motion to dismiss prisoner's deaf flanc6's ADA's claims); Duffy v.
Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996) (reversing summary judgment against a deaf inmate
who was denied an interpreter at prison disciplinary hearings); Kaufman v. Carter, 952
FSupp. 520, 529-31 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (denying motion to dismiss a bilateral amputee
inmate's claim for a violation of the ADA); Carty v. Farrely, 957 F.Supp. 727, 741 (D.V.I. 1997)
(holding that prison officials violated ADA by placing an inmate who used a cane among the
care of mentally-ill inmates); Saunders v. Horn, 960 ESupp. 893, 901 (E.D.Pa 1997) (denying
a motion to dismiss the claim of an inmate who was denied orthopedic shoes and braces);
Herndon v. Johnson, 970 ESupp. 703, 703-04 (E.D.Ark. 1997) (denying a motion for partial
judgment against an inmate with a fused spine who was denied assistive devices).
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the statute.59 After examining the language of Title II, the Crawford
Court applied the Gregory plain statement rule.6° Noting that prison
administration was a core function of state governments, the court
reasoned that because the statutory definition of "public entity"
included every agency of state or local government, Congress
clearly made the ADA applicable to state prisons.61 The court
concluded that state prisons are prohibited from discriminating
against disabled prisoners on account of disability because the
plain statement rule does not prevent application of the ADA to
state prisons. 62
The Fourth Circuit continued to disagree with its sister circuits
and extended Torcasio by subsequently holding that the ADA did
not apply to thirteen disabled inmates who brought suit against
prison officials for violation of Title H.63 After evaluating the
decisions of the other circuits, the Fourth Circuit analyzed that
language of Title H.1 The court held that only where Congress has
59. Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corrections, 115 F3d 481, 483-84 (7th Cir. 1997).
Crawford, a former state prisoner, sought damages from the Indiana prison administration
under Title II of the ADA. Id. at 483. On the ground that the ADA was inapplicable to prison
inmates, the district court dismissed the suit on the pleadings. Id. The state conceded that
the statute was applicable to prisons, but asked the court to make an exception to such
application by not extending protection to prisoners. Id. at 484.
60. Crawford, 115 F.3d at 485. The court attacked the argument that Congress cannot
invade an "essential state function, such as prison administration, without a clear statement
of its intent to invade it." Id.
61. Id. The court cautioned thatmaybe there is an inner core of sovereign functions,
such as the balance of power between governor and state legislature, that if somehow
imperiled by the ADA would be protected by the [plain] statement rule . . . but the mere
provision of public services, such as schools and prisons, is not within that inner core. Id.
62. Id. at 485-86. The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the Crawford Court in
permitting application of the ADA to state prisoners. Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,
1024 (9th Cir. 1997); Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997). In Armstrong,
the court noted that whether inmates "benefit" from prison programs was "irrelevant to the
issue of whether state prisons may exclude disabled inmates from programs they provide to
others or discriminate against disabled inmates in the various aspects of prison life." 124
F3d at 1024.
63. Amos v. Ma Dep't of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 126 F3d 589 (4th Cir.
1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S.Ct. 2339 (1998). Inmates with disabilities claimed that
prison officials: (1) denied them the opportunity to participate in work release and
pre-release programs because of their disabilities, resulting in a denial of benefits, training,
and rehabilitation, and in longer sentences; (2) denied them equal access to bathrooms,
athletic facilities, the "honor tier," and food services at [the prison] because of their
disabilities; (3) denied them adequate medical attention and hygienic facilities; (4) failed to
make reasonable accommodations to ensure the safety of disabled inmates; and (5) assigned
them to [the prison] because of their disabilities, thereby depriving them of the opportunity
to serve their sentences at available facilities closer to their homes. Id. at 591. Relying on
Torcasio, the district court granted summary judgment for the prison officials. Id.
64. Amos, 126 F.3d at 594-96. The court noted that "nothing in the opinions of those
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spoken with unmistakably clear intent would it invade the
sovereign powers of the states, including the power to manage
state prisons. 8 To avoid improperly altering the balance between
the states and the federal government, the court relied on the plain
statement rule to prevent application of the ADA to state prisons.68
The history of the ADAs application in the state prison context
reveals that the federal courts have applied the Gregory plain
statement rule inconsistently.67 In Yeskey, the Supreme Court failed
to decide whether the rule governed the application of the ADA to
state prisoners. Instead, the Court assumed that the Gregory rule
applied to the issue at bar and held that the requirement of the rule
was satisfied.68 The Court chose not to clarify the application of the
rule. However, the Court provided an appropriate analysis that
courts should follow when construing the language of a federal
statute amidst a core state function, such as the management of
state prisons.
When the plain statement rule -is invoked, courts must defer to
the sovereign interests of the states. Demonstrating this initial
consideration, the Court recognized the strong interest of state
control over the operations of state prisons.6 9 The Court conceded
that such an exercise was subject to the plain statement rule
without expressly stating that the rule applied. Moreover, where
sovereign interests are at stake, the language of the statute must
clearly encompass the state function at issue. If the statutory
courts holding to the contrary even begins to refute the careful analysis we undertook in
Tbrcasio."Id. at 591.
65. Id. at 594-95. The court stated that its reluctance in Torcasio to extend the
coverage of the statute to state prisons and prisoners "absent a far clearer expression of
intent was grounded on the ordinary rule of statutory construction that Congress must make

its intention to alter the constitutional balance between the States and the Federal
government unmistakably clear in the statute's language." Id. at 594. "It cannot be disputed
that the management of state prisons is a core state function." Id. at 595 (citing Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974)).
66. Amos, 126 F.3d at 596. The court held that it will not conclude that Congress has
"clearly subjected state prisons to its enactment" absent unequivocal intent "because the
management of state prisons implicates decisions of the most fundamental sort for a
sovereign entity." Id. (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991)).
67. Compare Crawford v. Ind. Dep't of Corrections, 115 E3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1997),
with Amos v. Ma. Dep't of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 126 F.3d 589, 596 (4th
Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S.Ct. 2339 (1998).
68. Pa. Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1954 (1998). "Assuming, without
deciding, that the -plain statement rule does govern application of the ADA to the
administration of state prisons, we think the requirement of the rule is amply met: the
statute's language unmistakeably includes State prisons and prisoners within its coverage."
Id.
69. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954.
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language does not clearly cover the function, then the statute will
not satisfy the requirement of the rule.70
The Court made its determination by examining the four corners
of the statutory text. Rather than exploring the legislative history of
the statute, the Court limited its analysis to the relevant statutory
language and concluded that the unambiguous language included
coverage of state prisons and prisoners. 71 However, in the event
that there is an ambiguous exception to the statute's coverage that
concerns the same or a similar state function, the statute will fail
to satisfy the rule. 72 Therefore, unless an existing exception makes
it unambiguously clear that the state function is excluded from
coverage, a finding that the plain statement rule is satisfied will not
be precluded.
Even if the plain statement rule should not govern the
application of the ADA to state prisoners, the Yeskey Court
nevertheless correctly decided that Title II of the ADA covers
inmates in state prisons. By enacting the ADA Congress sought to
clearly and comprehensively eliminate discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. Excluding state prisons and their
inmates from the protection of the ADA would create an exception
not found within the language of the statute. Moreover, such an
exemption from coverage would be inconsistent with Congress'
primary purpose in enacting the ADA.
Ryan M. Debski

70. Id. Because the language of the ADA "unmistakably" included coverage of state
prisons and prisoners, the Court held that the requirement of the rule is fulfilled. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1955-56. The Court rejected the Department's contention that an ambiguity
existed in the language of the statute. Id.

